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 Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, LQVWUXPHQWDO incoherence was 
for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. It was also conceived of as a 
metaphysically and ontologically innocuous source of normativity (Mackie 1977, 27-28; 
Dreier 1997, 93; cf. also Raz 2005, 26): if, for example, you intend to write a preface 
and you think that a necessary means to do so is to ignore your incoming emails, yet you 
have no motivation whatsoever to ignore your incoming emails, then your attitudinal co-
herence displays a normative failure. You are not as coherent as you ought to be.  
 However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ (Bratman 
1997; Broome 2001) and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements (e.g. 
Broome 2007; 2013; Brunero 2010; Kolodny 2005; Rippon 2011; Schroeder 2004), the 
innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject 
to debate (Broome 2005; 2008; Raz 2005; Kolodny 2005; 2007). This led to a para-
digmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and 
normativity. While there now exists considerable doubt that rational requirements are 
normative, it is commonly agreed that one’s QRUPDWLYHSRLQWRIYLHZ is a key feature of 
one’s rationality. Here the question is not only if one can hold a particular normative 
judgement and still be rational; what is significant too is whether your normative outlook 
coheres appropriately with your motivation. In fact, it is now commonly agreed that ra-
tionality requires us to intend to make the world fit with our first-personal ought beliefs. 
(QNUDVLD (i.e. coherence between your normative views and your motivation) is thus seen 
as a rational ideal and as a source of rational requirements.  
 Nevertheless, many elementary questions regarding the application, content, and sig-
nificance of an HQNUDVLDUHTXLUHPHQW remain unanswered, or subject to debate. For ex-
ample, why does rationality require us to be HQNUDWLF? Can an irrational ought-belief is-
sue requirements upon us? What is the logical form (i.e. ‘scope’) of the enkrasia-
requirement? Is the enkrasia-requirement best formulated as a state- or as a process-
requirement? Should we formulate the enkrasia-requirement as a synchronic or dia-
chronic requirement? Are there normative reasons to satisfy the enkrasia requirement? 
Does the enkrasia-requirement constitute a standard of correct reasoning? Do ought-
beliefs rationally cause intentions with or without the help of an external motivational at-
titude? 
 This special issue on ‘The Nature of the Enkratic Requirement of Rationality’ aims 
to answer some of these fundamental questions. The present papers take direct issue with 
the plausibility of an enkratic rationality, how to formulate a requirement of enkratic ra-
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tionality correctly, and whether enkratic reasoning represents correct reasoning. Further-
more, the assembled papers explore the relationship between enkratic rationality and 
normative uncertainty, the potential conflict between local enkratic coherence and one’s 
overall-degree of rationality, the authority of normative beliefs with regard to other fun-
damental principles of rationality, the possibility of rational akrasia, the ‘bootstrapping 
objection’ and its potential to thwart the view that attitudes entail normative reasons, and 
whether enkratic coherence really goes as far as requiring you to have an intention to $ 
whenever you believe that you ought to $. This special issue represents an important step 
forward in elucidating these elementary issues pertaining to a general theory of rational-
ity.  
 In closing, I would like to express my gratitude to those who contributed to the genesis 
of this special issue. First, and foremost, I am very grateful to Marián Zouhar, the chief 
editor of 2UJDQRQ), not only for inviting me to edit this special issue, but also for advis-
ing and helping me during the editorial process. I would also like to express my gratitude 
to Tibor Pichler, the director of the Institute of Philosophy, for facilitating my fruitful co-
operation with the Slovak Academy of Sciences and for making many things possible. 
Many thanks also to Lukáš Bielik for being extremely helpful during the entire editorial 
process.  
 I would also like to thank the authors of this special issue for their insightful contribu-
tions. I am very grateful that almost all authors took up my invitation to present their 
papers at a workshop at the University of Vienna (May 2013) sponsored by the ERC Ad-
vanced Grant ‘Distortions of Normativity’. The discussions at the workshop shaped, and 
sharpened, the arguments presented in this special issue. I am also very grateful to the 
numerous reviewers for their constructive suggestions and criticism.  
 Last, I would like to express my pride in the fact that this collection of papers from 
eminent and aspiring ‘Western philosophers’ is published in a Central European journal. 
I feel that an intensive cooperation and exchange between academics and institutions in 
the so-called ‘West’ and ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ is already long overdue. Both sides 
should intensify their efforts in facilitating such cooperation in the future. 
Julian Fink 
julian.fink@univie.ac.at 
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